Research Projects

Broadly speaking, I'm interested in how individuals perceive the passage of time and how such perceptions influence emotional experience and decision-making.  

Time Perspective and Emotional Experience

Socioemotional selectivity theory suggests that emotional experience is associated with shifting time horizons. Theoretically, perceived constraints on future time increase appreciation for life, which in turn elicits positive emotions such as happiness. Yet the very same temporal constraints heighten awareness that these positive experiences come to an end, thus yielding an emotional state known as poignancy – a mix of happiness and sadness. Our view is consistent with that of philosopher Karl Duncker who argued that poignancy results from recognizing that something once possessed is or will no longer be present: “A feeling of not having takes on a greater poignancy if it is a no-longer-having, a loss (whether of something actually or almost possessed)”. In Duncker’s framework, then, it is the awareness or anticipation of not having something that one once had that breeds poignancy. Duncker’s theorizing speaks directly to the intimate relationship between poignancy and endings in life that mark the passage of time. The heightened sense of mortality that occurs naturally as individuals progress through life gives rise to an appreciation of life’s fragility along with an awareness that the most cherished aspects of life are fleeting. Currently, with Professor Laura Carstensen, I am conducting research to examine the nature of poignancy, and how having such a feeling can affect decision-making and attention.

Self-continuity and Temporal Discounting

Economists and psychologists have previously proposed models to account for the failure of individuals to save adequate money for retirement. One such model, the multiple-self model, hypothesizes that the identities of individuals are temporally distinct, such that individuals distinguish between the current self and a future self. Poor saving behavior, then, results from an inability to view the future self as similar to the present self. Thus, if the future self is more like another person, people should not postpone rewards for this future self. Currently, with Professors Brian Knutson and Laura Carstensen, I am conducting a series of studies to examine the tenets of the multiple-self model of temporal discounting.

Research Experience

Life-span Development Lab, Department of Psychology, Stanford University. Mentor: Laura Carstensen, Ph.D. 2003-present.

Symbiotic Project on Affective Neuroscience Lab, Department of Psychology, Stanford University. Mentor: Brian Knutson, Ph.D., 2004-present.

Schizophrenia and Neuroimaging Laboratory, Harvard Medical School. Mentors: Robert McCarley, M.D. & Martha Shenton, Ph.D. 2001-2003.

Social Cognition Laboratory, Tufts University. Mentor: Keith Maddox, Ph.D. 1999-2001.

Social Emotion Laboratory, Harvard University. Mentors: Daniel Gilbert, Ph.D. & Erin Driver-Linn, Ph.D. 2000.

Gender Laboratory, Yale University. Mentors: Marianne LaFrance, Ph.D. & Julie Woodzicka, Ph.D. 1999.